Introduction
Bundling, that is the sale of two or more goods in combination as a package, is a common business practice. Following Adams and Yellen (1976) , two types of this practice are distinguished, pure and mixed bundling. In pure bundling, the individual goods are not sold separately but are sold only in combination. In mixed bundling the individual goods, as well as the package, are available.
1
In some cases, bundling may provide significant economies in the joint sale of the products as a bundle. Such economies may be in packaging or alleviation of information and search costs through the sale of "matching" components in a bundle. In other cases bundling may prevent problems of adverse selection. For example, a mandatory warranty ensures no adverse selection in the population buying warranties.
Often bundling is used as an instrument of price discrimination. The traditional theory of price discrimination (Adams and Yellen (1976) , Schmalensee (1984) , McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) ) is based on the assumption of monopoly. Under fairly general conditions they show that frequently bundling increases profits for the monopolist. In this paper, we focus on the possibility of mixed bundling under conditions of oligopoly. Other studies in this area are by Einhorn (1989) , Matutes and Regibeau (1992) , and Wilson (1991) .
2
Suppose we have a single firm (firm 1) that produces and sells two products, A 1 , and B 1 .
Let their prices if sold individually be p 1 and q 1 respectively. If the firm does not practice mixed bundling, the price of the combination of one unit of A 1 and one unit of B 1 is the sum 1 Examples of pure bundling are prix-fixe menus, mandatory warranties, bed with breakfast included in hotel accommodations, uniform delivered pricing, etc. Examples of mixed bundling are season tickets, monthly passes on trains, round-trip airline tickets, all-included vacation packages, film-with-camera, quantity discounts, etc.
The topic also touches issues of vertical integration and separation discussed in Economides and Salop (1992) . of their prices p 1 + q 1 . The composite good ("bundle") A 1 B 1 may also be offered separately at a price s 1 . Thus, not practicing mixed bundling can be thought of as operating under the restriction s 1 = p 1 + q 1 on the strategies of firm 1. In general, it is to the advantage of firm 1 to set all three prices, p 1 , q 1 , and s 1 , since the lifting of the restriction s 1 = p 1 + q 1 through mixed bundling cannot hurt the profits of a monopolist. If there are no restrictions in the sale of A 1 and B 1 , the bundle will sell positive amounts if s 1 < p 1 + q 1 . In most cases, introduction of mixed bundling, i.e., the relaxation of the restriction s 1 = p 1 + q 1 , will strictly decrease the price of the bundle s 1 and increase the prices of the separately-sold goods p 1 and q 1 .
The conditions of competition can be quite different when there are more than one competing firms, and therefore the analysis of the effects of mixed bundling becomes more complicated. Suppose that two vertically integrated firms, each producing one component of each type (firm i produces A i and B i ). Consider a two-stage game where in the first stage firms commit in using or not using a mixed bundling strategy, and in the second stage firms choose prices. Starting from a situation where no firm uses mixed bundling, suppose firm 1 decides to practice mixed bundling. As the price of firm 1's bundle s 1 decreases and the prices of firm 1's components p 1 and q 1 increase from their previous levels, the competing firm (firm 2) will adjust its prices in response. Despite the adjustments of the prices of firm 2, we expect that firm 1 will still be better off by using the mixed bundling strategy. If firm 2 practices mixed bundling as well, the effects are a priori uncertain. It is possible that, given that firm 1 practices mixed bundling, firm 2 prefers not to bundle. For the linear demand structure employed in this paper, it is shown that firm 2 prefers to bundle as well. Therefore the practice of (mixed) bundling is a dominant strategy for both firms and it constitutes an equilibrium.
There is no guarantee that profits will be higher in the bundling-bundling equilibrium than if both firms avoided bundling. Indeed, it is shown that, for most parameter values, the equilibrium profits are lower when both firms use mixed bundling than when both firms do not use mixed bundling. This is a classic prisoners dilemma situation. Both firms use a dominant strategy and they are worse off than if both their respective dominant strategies were not available. Matutes and Regibeau (1992) , working in a locational setting with 0-1 choices for consumers, find that, depending on the parameters, there can be two kinds of equilibria. In the first (that occurs for competitive situations), one firm bundles, and one does not. In the second, both firms bundle. Our results, in contrast, show both firms always practice mixed bundling at equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in section 2. In sections 3, 4, and 5, we discuss the price subgames that are played under given earlier decisions of firms to use mixed bundling or not to. In section 3 we consider bundling by both firms. In section 4 we discuss the case when no firm bundles. In section 5 there is bundling by only one firm. In section 6.1 we compare prices across regimes. In section 6.2 we compare profits in the different subgames, and establish the subgame perfect equilibrium. In section 7 there are concluding remarks.
Set-up
There are two types of goods, A and B. There are four components, two of each type, with a, b, c, d, e > 0. It is assumed that an increase in the prices of all four systems will decrease the demand for each system, i.e., b > c + d + e.
Suppose that firm i, i = 1,2, produces components A i and B i . This was named parallel vertical integration in Economides and Salop (1992) . Each firm i has three strategic variables, the price of the combination of both of each components, s ii , and the two prices of the individual components it produces, p i and q i . In the first stage, firms choose whether or not to practice mixed bundling in the subsequent stage of price choice. They each have two strategies, "B" for (mixed) bundling and "N" for no bundling. As explained earlier, the use of strategy "N" is interpreted as imposing the restriction s ii = p i + q i on the available strategies in the subsequent price subgame. Therefore strategy "N" can be interpreted as a commitment not to give preferential treatment to customers who buy other products of the firm. . We characterize the price equilibria in all three types of subgames. Then we go back and establish the subgameperfect equilibrium in the overall game structure.
Bundling by Both Firms
When both firms use mixed bundling, prices are s 11 = s 1 , s 12 = p 1 + q 2 , s 21 = p 2 + q 1 , s 22 = s 2 .
The market structure is shown in Figure 1 . The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions:
(1) ∂Π Thus, as expected, bundling will be used if it is an available strategy.
The equilibrium profits in the (Bundling, Bundling) subgame are
6 From the last two, it follows that p = q. Simplifying we have 
No Bundling by Both Firms
When neither of the two firms bundles, the price of any system is the sum of the prices of its component parts, s 11 = p 1 + q 1 , s 12 = p 1 + q 2 , s 21 = p 2 + q 1 , s 22 = p 2 + q 2 .
The profit functions of the vertically integrated firms are
). The solution of these yields the equilibrium prices 
Bundling by Only One Firm
Now suppose that only firm 1 bundles its components, while firm 2 commits in stage 1 not to sell its "pure" system at a lower price than the sum of the prices of its components. This The solution of the system (13)- (17) gives the following equilibrium prices: 
The firm that practices mixed bundling has higher profits,
Thus, price discrimination by one firm puts it in a superior position compared to the nondiscriminating firm.
Comparisons

Price Comparisons
We now compare the equilibrium prices of the three regimes. The equilibrium prices compare as follows . 9 We introduce the convention of dropping subscripts when both firms have the same prices. 
Comparison of Profits
Starting from a situation where no-one bundles, and assuming that the opponent does not bundle, a firm always has an incentive to bundle, Given that firm 1 bundles, firm 2 has higher profits if it bundles as well, Note that a firm's profits decrease as a result of a switch to bundling by the opponent, both when the firm is bundling and when it is not. For example, firm 2, following a nonbundling strategy, is hurt by the switch of firm 1 to bundling,
and firm 1, following a bundling strategy is hurt by the switch of firm 2 to bundling,
These two comparisons, are of course not important for the equilibrium of the game, since they compare profits of firm i across situations that differ only in the strategy of firm j ≠ i.
Comparing equations (6) and (12), we find that when composite goods are not very close substitutes, i.e., for b/c > 3.24, firms realize lower profits when they both bundle than when they both do not bundle,
Conversely, when the composite goods are very close substitutes, firms are better off when they both bundle.
Theorem 2: When the composite goods are not very close substitutes, firms are better off when they both commit not to use mixed bundling than when they both use such strategies.
Thus, when goods are not close substitutes, firms end up bundling when they would have been better off not bundling. This is a typical prisoners dilemma situation. Firms would be better off if they did not have the mixed bundling strategy available, for example, if bundling were illegal. 
Concluding Remarks
In the traditional literature, mixed bundling by monopolists is a profitable strategy. In duopoly, we showed two results. First, mixed bundling is used at equilibrium by both firms;
in fact, the use of mixed bundling is a dominant strategy for both firms. Second, when goods are not very close substitutes, using mixed bundling leads to lower profits for both firms in comparison to the profits achieved when both firms avoid using mixed bundling. Thus, this is a typical Prisoners' Dilemma situation: a profit-enhancing strategy under monopoly is still used by all firms in duopoly, although all players would be better off if this "profit-enhancing" strategy were not available.
In many areas of regulation, including, for example, telephone utility regulation, there are strict restrictions against bundling. Although they were primarily meant to be against pure bundling, they restrict mixed bundling as well. The theoretical rationale of these restrictions comes from the analysis of monopoly bundling. Our results show that equilibrium in duopoly competition is qualitatively different, and therefore these restrictions are misguided. Firms would compete more vigorously and would realize lower profits if restrictions on mixed bundling were
relaxed.
An important implication of this paper is that the application to duopoly of results derived from the analysis of monopoly is at least suspect. In fact, intuitively it seems likely that the use of other price discriminating strategies may produce similarly contrasting results in monopoly and duopoly settings. The analysis of this conjecture is an interesting open question.
In fact for 3 < b/c < 6 the prices under independent ownership also lie below the price for a hybrid system in the (B, N) regime, 
